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POSTSCRIPTS
Canon Law and Wills
In the last issue, The Catholic Lawyer
reprinted an article by Father Charles Connors entitled "Canon Law and Wills."' This
brief but interesting discussion purported
to set down some of the practical considerations of which the conscientious lawyer
should be aware in order to fulfill his client's intent. One such practical consideration pointed out by the author was the
possible differences in the tax consequences
of bequests to "religious."
In a recent case2 decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the possibility of differing tax consequences alluded to by Father Connors
was put into sharp focus. Section 812(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
(now section 2055) states that bequests
"to or for the use of" a religious institution
are not includible in the taxable estate. The
testatrix in this Second Circuit case executed her will in 1941, making her son, a
scholastic in the Society of Jesus, a beneficiary. In 1950, two days before the son
was to take his solemn vows of poverty,
chastity and obedience, he executed a written renunciation of all his property rights,
disposing of all properties and rights,
known or unknown, in favor of the Society.
The renunciation took effect after his solemn vows, and was a contract enforceable
at law.8 The testatrix learned of her son's
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solemn vows in 1953 and wrote her attorney as follows:
Lewis has been supported by the Jesuit
Order for 18 years, so naturally I would like
to remember him more than Frank, Jr., or
Bing, not that he will be able to keep it for
himself, but will be only too happy to pass
it on to the order .... 4
Upon the death of the testatrix in 1954
the executors sought to qualify the bequest
as one "to or for the use of" the Society of
Jesus, and thereby reduce the estate taxes.
They made two arguments: first, that the
bequest was to the Society, and second,
that the son was a constructive trustee for
the Society. As to the first contention the
Court stated that the testatrix's subsequent
knowledge of her son's vows did not alter
the fact that her bequest was to him, not
the Society. And, as to his being a constructive trustee, the Court held there was
no basis for such a claim:
There is no evidence whatever that Lewis
induced such a bequest by word or deed.
The bequest was made not because of any
representation to the testatrix that it would
go to the society .... It was Lewis' renunciation and assignment which was to be the
operative dispositive act-as the testatrix
plainly recognized. She did not, as she readily might have done, by her will, create any
interest of any kind, equitable or legal, conditional or executory in the society.5
Under canon law the son could not acquire
property after his solemn vows. Testatrix
was apparently generally aware of his ina-
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Burt v. Oneida Community, Ltd., 137 N.Y. 346,

33 N.E. 307 (1892). See also St. Benedict Order
v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (1914).

4 Cox v. Commissioner, supra notc 2.
5 Id. at col. 2 (emphasis added).
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bility to keep the property. Nevertheless,
as far as the courts are concerned it was
his renunciation, viewed as a contract,
which transferred the property from him to
the Society; the contract, not the canon law
was given effect. In the words of Father
Connors, "regrettable situations have resulted from conformance with canon law
exclusively, while ignoring civil law.""
State Efforts to Combat Obscenity
It is hardly necessary to reiterate here
the very difficult problems faced by any
state in its efforts to halt the increasing
influx of obscene publications onto local
newsstands.' The constitutional safeguards
of individual rights, although most desirable from the point of view of freedom of
thought and expression, have nonetheless
greatly reduced the number of weapons in
the state arsenals available to combat this
enemy of society. In times less sensitive to
individual freedoms, the ingenuity and even
the patience of the various state legislatures
was not so heavily, nor so often, taxed with
such little ultimate success. Nevertheless,
the problem remains and fortunately the
various states and even private citizens continue to expend their energies in serious
efforts to cope with it within constitutional
limits.
One such effort by the Legislature of
Rhode Isiand was recently subjected to
constitutional attack in that state's high
court, and survived it.2 The Legislature had
6 Connors, Canon Law and Wills, 7 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 308, 309 (1961).
1 See generally, St. John-Stevas, Obscenity, Literature and the Law, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 301
(1957); Sheerin, Censorship in Contemporary Society, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 292 (1957); Tobin,
State and Federal Censorship, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 312 (1957).
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created the Rhode Island Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth and charged
its members by Resolution No. 73 as
follows:
It shall be the duty of said commission to
educate the public concerning any book,
picture, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or
other thing containing obscene, indecent or
impure language, as defined in chapter 11-31
of the general laws . . . and to investigate
and recommend the prosecution of all violations of said sections ....
In exercising their legislative mandate, the
Commission members compiled lists of
publications which they felt were "completely objectionable for sale, distribution
or display for youths under eighteen
years." 4 They sought to gain the cooperation of local distributors by voluntary removal of the objectionable items, stating
that receipt of such cooperation would bar
the necessity of their recommending prosecutions to the attorney general. Various
distributors complied with these suggestions, and returned their supplies of paperbound books on the list to the publishers.
Two publishers attacked Resolution No.
73 as an unconstitutional infringement of
their first amendment freedom of the press,
and further alleged that as construed by
the Commission the resolution was unconstitutionally applied. In what was perhaps
a refreshing change of pace in this area,
the Court found "no difficulty in declaring
the resolution constitutional." 5 The Court
analyzed Resolution No. 73 in the following words:
On its face it does not authorize previous
restraint of freedom of the press. . . . The
functions conferred are solely educative and
3 Id. at -, 176 A.2d at 394-95.
4 Id. at -,176 A.2d at 395.

5 Ibid.
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investigative in aid of the legislAtive policy
to prevent the dissemination of obscene and
impure literature, especially as it affects the
morality of youth. 6

The Court very carefully pointed out that
a distributor might with impunity refuse to
respond to any Commission suggestions,
and also that the Commission could recommend prosecution but could not order it.
In handling the alleged unconstitutional
application of the resolution by the Commission, the Court overruled this objection
on the ground that the Commission did no
more than seek and receive the voluntary
cooperation of the distributors. It stated
that
it is no justification for petitioners to argue
as they do that because the local distributor
will not want to oppose the commission such
a practice has the inevitable result of7 suppression of their books by censorship.
A dissenting opinion concurred with the
majority insofar as it found the resolution
constitutional, but disagreed as to the actions of the Commission. It was the view
of the dissent that the Commission had
construed its authority to include the prevention of the sale or distribution of publications deemed objectionable, and had
acted on this premise. The dissent concluded, not that the Commission's actions
were unconstitutional, but more simply,
that it had exceeded its authority. Thus,
quite easily, the dissent decided it was not
necessary to pass upon the constitutionality
of the Commission's actions.
Resolution No. 73 was held to be free
of constitutional objection. Perhaps, the
only difficulty with this type of legislation
is the efficiency with which it can be carried out in the face of constitutional re6 Ibid.
7

Id. at -, 176 A.2d at 397.

strictions. In this particular, majority and
dissent differed, but even here constitutional problems were quite cleverly avoided
by the approach of the dissent.
State Aid to Private Schools
Many states have had to resolve the
problem of whether their respective constitutions permitted them to pass legislation
providing bus transportation, textbooks or
lunches for students in nonpublic schools.'
When finally presented to the particular
state's high court for a constitutional determination, as such legislation generally is,
the results have differed. The reasons for
this difference in conclusions at times lie
in the specific wording of the state constitution involved, but, more often, the question seems to turn on the attitude of the
state court toward the "child-benefit" theory, the most consistent argument raised
to support such legislation.
Recently, the Assistant Superintendent
for Pupil Personnel and Special Education
Services of Tulsa requested an opinion involving a ramification of this constitutional
problem from its attorney. It is to be noted
that the opinion in no way represented a
court adjudication; it was advisory in nature. Specifically, the assistant superintendent wished to know the responsibility,
if any, of the Tulsa public schools for providing special services, such as those of
the reading clinic, the tests and measurements department or speech therapy, to
children who live within the school district
but who are enrolled in nonpublic schools.
It was the opinion of the school district's
attorney2 "that the Tulsa School District
1 See Reed, The School Bus Challenge, 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER 99 (1959); see also 6 CATHOLIC

LAWYER 323 (1960).
2 Since the opinion was of an advisory nature and
involved no court adjudication, it has not, to the
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[had] no obligation to provide special services to any child who [was] not enrolled
in the Tulsa Public Schools." He was
"further of the opinion that the school
district [was] prohibited from furnishing
such services to those children who have
elected to attend a parochial school rather
than public schools." The basis for this
latter conclusion was a decision of the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma invol ving bus
transportation legislation,3 and an advisory
opinion of the State Attorney General to
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction concerning the availability of the National School Lunch Program to parochial
school students.
The Oklahoma constitution, Article 2,
Section 5 provides:
No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, donated, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.
The Oklahoma legislature passed a bus
transportation bill in 1939, making such
transportation available to children attending nonpublic schools along or near the
transportation route to the public schools.
In Gurney v. Ferguson,3 the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma held the statute unconstitutional. The argument made in defense of
the statute was that it benefited the children, not the schools. Terming this argument "not impressive" the Court stated:
knowledge of the Editors, been published in any
source of general circulation. The CatholicLawyer

gratefully acknowledges the kindness of Mr. C. H.
Rosenstein, Attorney for the Independent School
District No. I of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, in
providing this publication with information concerning the basis for his opinion.
3 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941).
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It is true that this use of public money and
property aids the child, but it is no less true
that practically every proper expenditure
for school purposes aids the child. We are
convinced that this expenditure, in its broad
and true sense, and as commonly understood, is an expenditure in furtherance of
the constitutional duty or function of maintaining schools as organizations or institutions. The state has not authority to maintain
a sectarian school....
If the cost of the school bus and the maintenance and operation thereof was not in
aid of the public schools, the expenditure
therefor out of the school funds would be
unauthorized and illegal. Yet we assume it
is now acquiesced in by all that such expenditures are properly in aid of the public
schools and are authorized and legal expenditures. . . . [I]t would seem necessarily
to follow that when pupils of a parochial
school are transported that such service
4
would likewise be in aid of that school.
The opinion of the Attorney General
was in response to a question posed by the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
The latter official asked whether public
school cafeterias operated under the National School Lunch Program could be
opened to parochial school students in the
district, on the theory that their release at
noon from the parochial schools placed
them under public school supervision on
the lunch hour. The Attorney General in
his opinion stated that the Gurney principle would seem to preclude such a program. On the basis of these events, the
attorney for the Tulsa School District was
of the opinion that special services were
equally unavailable to nonpublic school
students.
Certainly, the Gurney case seemed to
lay to rest the "child-benefit" theory in
Oklahoma. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
see how a reading clinic or speech therapy
4 Id. at -, 122 P.2d at 1003-04.
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for parochial school children can endanger
the principle of separation of church and
state in that state. So long as school funds
are used to finance such special services,
the Gurney argument to the effect that
school funds must be used for the support
of schools would be available to defeat a
"child-benefit" approach. The same result
might equally be predicated if general
funds were used, under the Oklahoma constitution. However, were general public
funds appropriated for this purpose, it

would seem possible to contend that such
legislation was in fact in aid of the child
and sustainable as a general welfare measure. The benefit to the private school, in
such a case, would appear to be most incidental to the interests of the child, which
the state may properly protect. It would be
a torturous piece of reasoning that would
place a parent in the position of having to
sacrifice his natural right to select his
child's training in order to guarantee the
child the benefits of speech therapy.

